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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030373-CA
v.
TONYA ALTHOFF,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals a judgment and conviction of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2003), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002); Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44.6 (Supp. 2003); and Driving on Suspended or Revoked Driver's License, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(l)(1998), and Failure to
Secure New Registration and New Certificate of Title for her automobile, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-703(2002), the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996 & Supp. 2001).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly determine that it was proper for the
Monticello Chief of Police to testify concerning the amount of methamphetamine
typically possessed for personal use?
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling concerning the admissibility of opinion
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Perkins v. Fit-Well Artificial
Limb Co., 514 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1973) ("The trial judge is allowed a wide discretion in
his control over the examination of witnesses - lay and expert alike").
Issue 2: Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to sustain defendant's
conviction on all five counts of the information?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is clear error.
However, because defendant has not briefed this issue, it should be deemed waived. See,
e.g., State v. Bartlett, 2004 UT App 103 (Memorandum Decision) (Addendum A); Pixton
v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in full in
Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (Supp. 2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2003);
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was arrested following a traffic stop in Monticello, Utah, on September
23, 2002. R. 141:54. On September 26, 2002, she was charged by information with one
count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iii)(Supp. 2003); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2003); driving under the influence of alcohol
or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (Supp.
2003); driving on suspended or revoked driver's license, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(l)(1998);and Failure to secure new registration
and new certificate of title for her automobile, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-703(2002). Following a one-day jury trial, defendant was
convicted on all counts. R. 90. On May 19, 2003, defendant received a one-to-15-year
prison term, 12 months in jail, a fine of $925 and 36 months probation. R. 115-17.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 118.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The confession
When arresting officers discovered methamphetamine in her car, defendant did not
hesitate to admit that the drugs belonged to her. R. 141:61, 71. She also acknowledged

3

that a gym bag containing scales and baggies belonged to her. R. 141:69. And when
asked how often she used methamphetamine, defendant responded "[o]nce a day," then
corrected herself. "No, twice/' she said. R. 141:89. She even admitted she had used the
drug earlier in the day, an assertion confirmed laboratory analysis performed on her urine.
R. 141:61-62.
These revelations, all offered following a proper Miranda warning, were revealed
during an encounter with Monticello police officers, an encounter that began
inauspiciously when Officer Jim Eberling observed a vehicle driving erratically and
decided to investigate. R. 141:50. The vehicle crossed the center dotted line in the road,
overcorrected and swerved across the outside fog line before finally pulling off the road.
Id Officer Eberling pulled up behind the vehicle and turned on his overhead lights. Id.
Officer Eberling spoke with defendant, the driver of the vehicle, and asked her if
she was all right. Id. She replied that she had been driving a long time and was tired. R.
141:50-51. After apparently finding no obvious signs of intoxication, the officer
concluded the traffic stop and returned to his vehicle as defendant drove away. R. 141:51.
However, Officer Eberling pulled defendant over again a short time later after
checking the car's license plates and learning that they had expired, even though the
registration sticker on the plate indicated it did not expire for several months. Id. After
stopping the vehicle, Officer Eberling checked defendant's driver's license and learned
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that it was suspended. Id. He then arrested her for driving on a suspended license and
placed her in his squad car. R. 141:53.
Officer Eberling then returned to the car and asked a passenger, Kevin
Rothlisberger,1 to exit so the officer could perform a search. Id. The officer immediately
discovered a small baggy containing a white, powdery substance on the console between
the driver and passenger seats. Id. Officer Eberling suspected the substance in the bag
was methamphetamine. Id. He also discovered the gym bag in the back seat of the car
that contained drug scales, which were covered with a white residue, and several baggies.
R. 141:59. Eberling arrested Rothlisberger. R. 141:54.
About that time, Monticello Police Chief Kent Adair arrived to assist Officer
Eberling. R. 141:83. Chief Adair noted that Rothlisberger acted very nervous when
officers came near the passenger side door. R. 85. While searching the passenger side of
the vehicle, Chief Adair discovered a second baggy stuffed inside a toilet paper roll,
which was concealed by a pair of men's jeans stuffed into the passenger-side door panel.
R. 141:85. Analysis later determined the bag in fact contained 32 grams of
methamphetamine. R. 141:58, 100. Chief Adair then checked the pockets of the jeans
and discovered a "little bottle with a snort tube attached," a device used to both store and
use methamphetamine. R. 141:86. Rothlisberger admitted the pants and the device were

1

Rothlisberger was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and has appealed. See Case No. 20030494-CA.
5

his. R. 141:97. Rothlisberger also admitted that he and defendant had both used
methamphetamine earlier that day. R. 141:88.
An amicable arrest
Following their arrest, defendant and Althoff were highly cooperative,
volunteering information about their use and purchasing of methamphetamine.
Rothlisberger also admitted he had used methamphetamine earlier in the day and that the
snort tube discovered in the search belonged to him. R. 141:87-88. Defendant, too, was
forthcoming, acknowledging the methamphetamine had been purchased in Bluff. R.
141:69.
Despite their candor, they did not volunteer the location of the drugs, which
officers had to discover on their own. The first baggy containing a small amount of
methamphetamine was quickly discovered in plain view between the driver and passenger
seats. R. 141:53-54. Eberling also found a gym bag in the back seat of the car that
contained drug scales, which were covered with a white residue, and several baggies. R.
141:59. A second baggy of methamphetamine was discovered by Monticello Police
Chief Kent Adair, who, after arriving to assist in the arrest, observed that Rothlisberger
acted very nervous while Officer Eberling searched the front passenger seat. R. 141:83,
85.
"I went over and told Jim - Officer Eberling - that whatever he was looking for
was in the front passenger seat," Chief Adair recalled. R. 141:85.
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Chief Adair discovered the second baggy inside a toilet paper roll hidden
underneath a pair of men's pants that had been stuffed into the door panel on the
passenger's side of the car. R. 141:84-85. Analysis later determined the baggy contained
nearly 32 grams of methamphetamine. R. 141:58, 100.
With the discovery of these additional items, defendants resumed their candid
acknowledgment of culpability. Rothlisberger admitted the pants and the snort tube
discovered in the pocket were his. R. 141:97. He told Chief Adair, '"I got that [the
device] - I've had that or I got that in my divorce,' or 'I've had that since my divorce.'"
R. 141:87. Defendant claimed that all of the "crystal meth" was hers and that defendant
knew nothing about it. R. 141:61.
Preliminary Hearing
Both officers testified at Rothlisberger's and defendant's preliminary hearing. See
R. 214 (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, held December 2, 2002 ). After testifying to
the events up to and including the arrest and search, Eberling was asked whether, in his
opinion, the drugs found in the car were for personal use or for distribution. R. 214:1819.
[MR. HALLS]: Officer, have you had drug cases where
people have had methamphetamine that you believe to be for
personal use?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And can you tell me about the quantity and how
packaged, how it's kept when it's in that condition?
7

A.
Usually when it's for personal use it's like that first
baggy I found that was on the console. That's pretty
common. Small, small amounts in a small bag.
Q.
You have charged her [Althoff] with possession with
the intent to distribute. Why do you feel like this is a
distribution case?
A.
The scales that I believe were used are for drugs. The
plastic bags for packaging the 31-2 grams or 1.1 ounces of
meth in the small - in the bag that was found in the passenger
door. That's a quantity that's saleable, and with the scale and
the baggies, I believe that's for distribution.
Id. This testimony was admitted without objection. Id.
Trial
At trial, Officer Eberling and Chief Adair again testified about the bust and the
significance of the quantities found in the car. Testimony concerning the significance of
the quantities of methamphetamine was first elicited by counsel for Rothlisberger during
cross-examination of Officer Eberling.
[MS. REILLY]: I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 right here
was what you found on the console, right?
[OFFICER EBERLING]: Yes.
Q.

That was with a small amount?

A.

Uh-huh..

Q.

Is that characteristic of what's sold?

A.

Yes.
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Q.
It is. What - 1 mean you testified you believed it was for sale
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)?
A.

I don't -

R. 141:64.
During his testimony, Chief Adair commented generally on the significance of
quantities of methamphetamine.
[MR. HALLS]: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in
your experience to look or see how methamphetamine is
usually packaged as far as - when you have found
methamphetamine in your experience (inaudible) have you
found times when people have had personal use amounts?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity?

A.
A quarter or half grams [sic], right in there. Maybe
even at the most a gram. . . .
Q.
Do you have -- through your training and experience,
do you know commonly what somebody would buy if they
were to go out on the street buy some right now, what would
they usually get for personal use? . ..
A.
In our undercover investigations when we buy from
individuals, we usually buy a quarter or a half a gram.
Q.
Have you ever found in your experience that someone
who had personal quantities of methamphetamine to have
scales?
A.

It's not common, no.
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Q.
Do you know what those kind of items are used for
other than - have you seen these kinds of baggies where you
have found methamphetamine?
A.
Y e s . . . . It's quite common with methamphetamine,
cocaine and those drugs in small quantities. You don't see
that with marijuana.
Q.

Have you ever - have you seen scales like this before?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In what context?

A.
Usually people that have quantities of drugs have
scales.
R. 141:90-92.
Defense attorneys objected to this testimony, claiming it was "expert testimony"
under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and, as such, was improper because the State had
not given the defense 30 days advance notice, as required by statute.2 R. 141:104-05.
The trial court overruled the objection, holding that Chief Adair testified as a "lay
witness" under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence, which allows opinion testimony that
"would be rationally based on his perception, and would be helpful to a clear
understanding or determination of the facts and issues." R. 141:105.

2

Defense attorneys apparently made this objection during an unrecorded side-bar
conference, then articulated the basis for the objection later outside the presence of the
jury. R. 141:90, 104-08.
10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly admitted Chief Adair's testimony concerning the
significance of different quantities of drugs. The State named Chief Adair as a witness
long before trial and defendant was well aware she would have to counter testimony
concerning the significance of the drug quantities. Moreover, contrary to defendant's
claim that Chief Adair testified as an expert, the testimony is more aptly viewed as lay
opinion testimony, which is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 701, or simply as statements
of fact admissible without appeal to rules governing opinion testimony. Alternatively,
even assuming Chief Adair testified as an expert, the notice requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) were met because the same testimony was offered at defendant's
preliminary hearing by Officer Eberling. Finally, even assuming the testimony was
improperly admitted, defendant cannot show prejudice because Officer Eberling's
testimony put defendant on notice that such testimony would likely be presented at trial
and defendant, thus, had ample opportunity to prepare for rebuttal. Defendant's claim of
surprise is especially hollow given that he opened the door by eliciting testimony from
Officer Eberling concerning the significance of the quantities of methamphetamine.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED CHIEF ADAIR'S
TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
DIFFERENT QUANTITIES OF DRUGS.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing Chief Adair's testimony
concerning the significance of the drug quantities. Aplt. Br. at 8-12.3 "Either Adair's
testimony was violative of [defendant's] discovery or statutory rights or Adair is not an
expert and should not have been allowed to give testimony about distribution." Id. at 8.
This argument fails.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in overruling her objections to Adair's
testimony because the content of his testimony concerning drug quantities was not
disclosed to the defense, although Adair's name was on a witness list provided by the
State to defendant. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. This claim is premised on two legal theories. First,
defendant claims that rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, required the State to
disclose that Adair would be called as a witness and the substance of his testimony. Id. at
9-11. Second, she claims that Adair's testimony was expert testimony under rule 702,
Utah Rules of Evidence, which required the State to provide Adair's name, a copy of his

3

This claim is unpreserved because defendant did not argue at trial that the state
violated rule 16. Thus, this claim can only be reversed on a showing of plain error. State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). To demonstrate plain error, defendant must
show that error occurred, that it was obvious and that it was harmful. State v. Adams, 955
P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1998). Defendant has not even claimed plain error, let alone
demonstrated it.
12

vitae and a written explanation of his testimony. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a).
These arguments are meritless.
A.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Allowing
Chief Adair to Testify About the Drug Quantities.

Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Adair to testify
about drug quantities because Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, required the
State to disclose not only Adair's name but also the substance of his testimony. Rule
16(a) states that, upon request, the prosecutor must disclose (1) written or recorded
statements of the defendant, (2) his or her criminal record, (3) physical evidence, (4)
exculpatory evidence and (5) "any other item of evidence which the court determines on
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense." Although not specifically required, a party's discovery
duties typical include disclosure of a witness list. Although the State provided defendant
with a witness list that included Chief Adair, defendant still complains that the State
should have detailed his testimony concerning drug quantities. Aplt. Br. at 8-11.
This claim fails, first, because it was not preserved and defendant does not argue
plain error. Although the record does not specifically identify the basis for the objection,
it is clear that the objection is based on Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a), which requires
at least 30-days notice to opposing parties for expert witnesses. Because the claim is not
preserved, defendant must show plain error to prevail.
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Second, defendant's claim of a discovery violation fails because she was wellaware of most of Adair's testimony because he testified at the preliminary hearing. See,
e.g, State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 25, 989 P.2d 52 ("'[T]here is substantial authority that
the prosecutor cannot be cited for a discovery violation where the defendant had
knowledge of the existence of the item that the State failed to disclose'") (citing State v.
White, 931 S.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Mo. App.1996)). The only addition to Adair's testimony
at trial were his brief comments concerning the amounts of methamphetamine typically
possessed by users, its street value and that users generally do not possess scales. R.
141:90-92. This testimony covers the same ground as the testimony given by Officer
Eberling at the preliminary hearing that users generally have "small, small amounts [of
meth] in a small bag," while the scales and baggies discovered in defendant's car were for
repackaging and selling the drugs. R. 214:18-19. Because defendant was aware, from
the preliminary hearing, that she would have to rebut testimony concerning the
significance of the drug amounts, she cannot now complain she was not provided
information she already had. Thus, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to
exclude Chief Adair's testimony on the Accordingly, defendant's claims are meritless.
B.

Chief Adair's Testimony was Either Lay Opinion or
Statements of Fact; In Either Case, It was not Expert
Testimony and did not Require 30-days Notice.

Next, defendant claims Adair's testimony should have been excluded because it
was expert testimony under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that the State had not
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provided adequate notice for such testimony. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 11. Under Utah law,
a party intending to call an expert witness "shall give notice to the opposing party as soon
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). "If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. §
77-17-13(3).4
First, defendant's argument fails because she did not request a continuance. Under
the notice statute, a party is entitled a continuance, but only if she asks for one. State v.
Perez, 2002 UT App 211, % 41, 52 P.3d 451 ("In the absence of a request, the trial court
had no duty to order a continuance"). Although defendant's trial counsel objected to the
introduction of Chief Adair's testimony, she did not request the only relief provided for in
the statute.5 Thus, she cannot now fault the court for failing to do what she failed to
request.
4

The wording of this statute was substantially changed in 2003 to read: "If the
defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the requirements of this
section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled
to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the
testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (emphasis added to highlight new
language). This version became effective May 5, 2003.
5

The only remedy available absent a showing of bad faith. See 77-17-13(4)(b) ("If
the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the
part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of
exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if the court finds that a party
deliberately violated the provisions of this section").
15

Second defendant's claim fails because Chief Adair was not testifying as an
"expert." The Utah Rules of Evidence, like similar rules in virtually every state and
federal court, recognize two kinds of opinion testimony - expert and lay. Rule 702,
which applies to expert witnesses, states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Rule 701 states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness'
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination
of a fact in issue.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that witnesses who testify about matters
that may be subject to scientific analysis are not necessarily expert witnesses under Rule
702. In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190-91 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
reviewed defendant's claim that a security guard who testified that footprints discovered
outside of a burglarized residence appeared to be the same as those inside. Id. at 190.
The defendant claimed that admission of this testimony was improper because the guard
did not have the expertise to offer an opinion on the footprints. Id. The Supreme Court
soundly rejected this claim, holding that:
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It is difficult to understand how [the guard's] lay testimony in
the form of an opinion became expert testimony. Simply
because a question might be capable of scientific
determination, helpful lay testimony touching on the issue and
based on personal observation does not become expert
opinion. It is true that if a question is capable of scientific
determination, then expert testimony is admissible with
respect to i t . . . ; however, that does not mean that lay opinion
testimony is prohibited if the provisions of the evidentiary
rule are met.
Id at 191 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 978 (3rd Cir. 1986) (government witness's testimony concerning
his understanding of extortion defendant's ambiguous statements is permissible lay
opinion testimony); Fairley v. State, 2003 WL 22724713,

So. 2d

, ^ 16 (Miss.)6

(police officer's testimony concerning workings of a gun is lay, not expert testimony);
Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. App. 1991) (police officers may offer
opinion on intoxication or impairment by drugs without qualifying as an expert); State v.
Rubio, 798 P.2d 206, 207 (N.M. App. 1990) (cocaine dealer may offer lay opinion
testimony identifying cocaine and marijuana); see also Chess v. State, 357 S.W.2d 386,
387-88 (Tex. Cr. App. 1962) (police officer may testify on smell of marijuana without
being qualified as an expert); Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 442-43 (Utah App.
1993) (officer may offer lay testimony that substance was marijuana based on "distinctive
aroma" and defendant's bloodshot eyes and slow speech).

6

Westlaw citation pending.
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Similarly, Chief Adair's testimony, although perhaps amenable to expert treatment,
was properly admitted as lay opinion testimony. Chief Adair testified that in his personal
experience those who possess methamphetamine for personal use generally have less than
a gram. R. 141:91-92. He also stated that "[u]sually people that have quantities of drugs
have scales." Id. at 92. These "opinions," if they are such, were "rationally based on the
perception of the witness and .. . helpful to a clear understanding of the witness5
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 701. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
Alternatively, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible because his statements were
not opinions at all, but statements of fact.7 Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by the
trial court when asked to reconsider the same issues in a post-trial motion by
Rothlisberger for a certificate of probable cause. R. 211-13. "The testimony] actually
turned out to be neither expert testimony or lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony
about Adair's actual experiences." R. 212. A number of courts have taken this view of
testimony involving descriptions of the drug trade drawn from law enforcement officers
experience. See, e.g, United States v. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1996) (law
7

Indeed, this was the conclusion of the court when asked to reconsider the
question during a post-trial motion filed by co-defendant Rothlisberger. The court states:
"As it turned out[,] Adair actually testified only that, in his experience, individual
packages of methamphetamine hold only fractions of a gram, that each contains two to
eight doses, that individual users usually do not have scales and that dealers use small
baggies to package their produce for sale. That [testimony] actually turned out to be
neither expert testimony or lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's
actual experiences." State v. Rothlisberger, Case No. 20030494-CA, R. at 212.
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enforcement agent's testimony concerning practices within drug trade not opinion
testimony); United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 12 (1 st Cir. 1996) ("This testimony was not
opinion testimony at all, but a simple recitation of an observed phenomenon: the price
paid for the coins5'); Davenport v. United States, 197 F.2d 157, 158 (5th Cir. 1952)
(officer's testimony concerning item of drug paraphernalia called a "finger stall" "was
neither immaterial nor a conclusion. The witness was not asked to give his opinion as to
the use was made or intended to be made of the particular finger stall found. In
connection with his testimony as to finding it, he was asked, and testified, about the
nature and uses of finger stalls as he had observed them in his work as a narcotic officer.
The answers made were relevant and factual, and it was not error to admit them in
evidence").
In DiMarzo, the investigating agent, like Chief Adair, was one of the arresting
officers and testified about the "sting" operation resulting in the arrest of defendant and
others. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d at 658-59. The agent also testified concerning practices in the
drug trade, such as whether drug crime participants generally carry guns and whether
innocent observers are invited to drug transactions. Id. at 659. The defendant claimed on
appeal that this was improperly admitted expert testimony because the prosecutors had
not provided proper notice under the federal rules. Id. The court rejected this contention,
holding that the agent's testimony
expressed neither a lay nor an expert opinion, as distinguished
from a statement of fact as to what [the agent] had witnessed
during his 29 years in law enforcement. As the challenged
19

testimony proffered no opinion, lay or expert, but simply the
witness's personal experience relating to a subject bearing
directly upon the appropriateness of a jury inference,... we
reject the claim.
Id. at 659-60 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Chief Adair similarly drew on his 20 years of law enforcement experience in
noting that those who possess methamphetamine for personal use usually have less than a
gram and generally do not have scales. Chief Adair never took the additional step of
opining that because of his experience, he believes that defendant possessed the drugs
with intent to distribute. In short, Chief Adair offered no opinion on the significance of
the quantities of methamphetamine possessed by defendant. Thus, whether viewed as
opinion or simply statements of fact, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible.
C.

Even Assuming Chief Adair Offered Expert Testimony,
Defendant Received Proper Notice Because the Same
Testimony was Admitted at the Preliminary Hearing.

Even if defendant is correct in characterizing Chief Adair's comments as expert
testimony, defendant received proper notice under the statute. Under Utah law, the party
proposing to use expert testimony must provide notice to the opposing party at least 30
days before trial. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). However, if the same expert
testimony is provided at the defendant's preliminary hearing, the law deems the notice
requirements to have been met. states:
[Testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications,
and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the
20

subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary
hearing.
The purpose of this rule is clear: To ensure parties have adequate time to prepare
to rebut expert testimony. State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1167, 1170 (Utah App.1998);
see also State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 1985). As one court noted: "The general
purpose of establishing a pretrial sequencing of disclosure for expert testimony is to
provide parties with adequate notice for purposes of effective cross-examination and an
opportunity for submission of contradicting evidence-in-chief." Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of New Jersey, Inc., v. Philip Morris, Inc., etal, 199 F.R.D. 484, 487 (E.D.N. Y.
2001). Moreover, this policy is explicitly embodied in the newest version of the statute,
which requires only that a party "substantially comply" with its requirements and provides
for a continuance only "if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice . .." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-17-13(4)(a) (effective May 5, 2003).
The Utah Supreme Court analysis of another notice statute is consistent with this
principle. In State v. Ortiz, the court reversed a trial court ruling granting the State's
motion to exclude an alibi witness because the defense had not provided the statutorily
required notice 10 days before trial. Id., 112 P.2d at 219. The defense had properly
notified State that there were two alibi witnesses, one of whom would testify at trial, but
designated a different witness eight days before trial when the original witness could not
be found. Id. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that there was "no
basis for concluding that the substitution of Revas for Crisbo would have created any
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unfair surprise or worked any undue hardship on the State.. . . Surely the State knew that
the alibi witness called by the defense, whether Crisbo or Revas, would corroborate this
version of the facts."
Similarly, in Reed v. United States, 828 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. App. 2003),
prosecutors disclosed the names and qualifications of two possible experts and provided
extensive background information and details concerning their proposed testimony ten
months before trial. Reed, 828 A.2d at 161. On the day the expert was to testify, the
prosecutor informed defense counsel that the expert was not one of the two disclosed
earlier. Id. at 163. Defendant claimed the substitution of new expert violated the state
notice statute. Id. The trial court rejected this challenge and the appellate court affirmed.
Id. The appellate court noted that the disclosure of the substance of the expert's
testimony left defendant "well-armed" for cross examination. Id.
Defendant in this case was equally well-armed for cross examining Chief Adair
because the same testimony was provided at defendant's preliminary hearing, albeit
through a different police officer. At defendant's preliminary hearing on December 2,
2002, both Officer Eberling and Chief Adair testified concerning the events preceding
defendant's arrest, but only Eberling testified concerning the significance of drug
quantities. Officer Eberling testified that those who possess methamphetamine for
personal use generally have "[s]mall, small amounts in a small bag." R. 214:18-19. He
also testified that, by contrast, the amount seized from the car in which defendant was
riding - nearly 32 grams - was many times the amount needed for personal use. Id.
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"That's a quantity that's saleable, and with the scale and the baggies, I believe that's for
distribution." Id.8
At trial, the State elicited testimony concerning the significance of the amount of
drugs from Chief Adair. Chief Adair stated that the amount of meth typically possessed
for personal use is "[a] quarter or half grams, right in there. Maybe even at the most a
gram. .. ." He also said that those who use meth would have little use for scales.
"[P]eople that have quantities of drugs have scales." R. 141:90, 91-92.
Because Chief Adair's testimony at trial was substantively identical to Officer
Eberling's testimony at the preliminary hearing, defendant cannot claim surprise.
Accordingly, the provisions of the notice statute were met and the admission of Chief
Adair's testimony was proper.
D.

Defendant has not Demonstrated Prejudice.

Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Chief Adair's
testimony and Officer Eberling's testimony at the preliminary hearing did not place
defendant on notice, defendant cannot show substantial prejudice. To prevail on her claim,
defendant must plausibly demonstrate how she would have prevailed if she had received the
30-day notice required by statute. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,120, n.3, 989 P.2d 1065.
Defendant has not and cannot make this showing. Defendant knew from the preliminary

8

Because Eberling expresses his belief that the quantity indicates defendant
intended to distribute the drug, his testimony arguably could be considered opinion
testimony under the analysis outlined in section I.A., above. By contrast, Chief Adair
never expresses an opinion concerning whether defendant intended to distribute.
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hearing that she would have to rebut testimony concerning the significance of various
quantities of drugs. Despite this advance notice, defendant did not request an expert report, a
curriculum vitae or any other information about Officer Eberling, even though she had every
right and ample opportunity to do so if she believed the officer was offering expert
testimony. Nor did she exercise her right to retain her own "expert" to rebut that testimony.
In sum, defendant has never stated what she would have done differently if she had received
formal notice of Adair's testimony or how such notice would affected the outcome of the
trial.
Defendant claims that it is not her burden to show prejudice but, rather, the state's
burden to show how a failure to explicitly apprise him of Adair's testimony did not create
unfair prejudice. Aplt. Br. at 10. Defendant misconstrues the relevant law. Utah law does
shift the prejudice burden to the State for discovery violations under some circumstances, but
only after defendant first "make[s] a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have
impaired the defense." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987); see also Arellano,
964 P.2d at 1171. In Knight, the State disclosed to the defense that it planned to call two
witnesses, but did not disclose the likely substance of their testimony, which had been
learned through interviews with investigators. A few days before trial, the defendant asked if
the witnesses had been located and was told, truthfully, that they had not. Knight, 734 P.2d
at 915. Afterward, however, the State did locate the witnesses and arranged for them to
testify at trial. Id. The defendant argued that these witnesses—one of whom testified that the
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defendant had asked her to offer a false alibi—were completely unexpected and devastating
to the defense. Id. at 915-16.
In reversing defendant's conviction, the Utah Supreme Court focused on two factors.
First, the defendant had no reason to expect the witnesses to testify. Second, defendant had
no advance warning of the substance of their testimony. Because these factors created a
credible argument that the failure to disclose impaired the defense, the court ruled that it
should be up to the State to show why the defense was not prejudiced. Id. at 921.
Neither of the factors identified by the Knight court are present here. Defendant knew
that both Adair and Eberling would testify because they were on the witness list provided by
the State. Defendant knew that one or both of them would testify about the significance of
the quantities of the drugs. Because neither of the Knight factors are present, and because
defendant had not made any argument as to how the alleged failure to disclose impaired her
defense, her claim of prejudice fails.
Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe she would have prepared any
differently if she had known the State planned to introduce this testimony through Chief
Adair at trial instead Officer Eberling. In short, defendant has not articulated how her
preparation or cross-examination of Chief Adair would have been any different or produced a
different result. Accordingly, her claim fails.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's conviction
be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of May, 2004
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
James Earl Bartlett,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20030063-CA

F I L E D
(April 8, 2004)
2004 UT App 103

Seventh District, Monticello Department
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
Attorneys: William L. Schultz, Moab, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros Jr., Salt Lake City, and
Craig C. Halls, Blanding, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant James Earl Bartlett challenges the district court's ruling
that the arresting officers1 search of his car was incident to a
lawful arrest. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Brown, 853

http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/mds/bartlett040804.htm
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state v. rmrueu

Fage lot 5

P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). Under this provision, "[w]arrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement." Id. "One such
recognized exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest based
upon probable cause under exigent circumstances." State v. Trane,
2002 UT 97,522, 57 P.3d 1052. "'[A] search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification.1" Id. at 523 (quoting United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 477 (1973)). "A
search of an automobile and its occupants pursuant to lawful arrest
[is] proper even for a misdemeanor arrest." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d
1245, 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Here, Bartlett concedes that the initial stop was valid. Further,
Bartlett was placed under arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant,
the search was contemporaneous with the arrest, and the search was of
the passenger compartment of the automobile. The arresting officers
thus needed no more justification to search the car, and the search
was valid.
Bartlettfs only argument that could be read to confront the search
incident to arrest doctrine is that the officers had an alternative
to searching the car--specifically, the officers could have turned
the car over to BartlettTs mother, who was present at the time.
Bartlettfs entire argument on this point consists of the statement
that "[t]here was no need to search Bartlett!s vehicle since it could
have been released to his mother."
Bartlett has not offered any legal authority for the proposition that
the presence of parties who are not implicated in any criminal
activity negates the authority of the arresting officers to search
the vehicle. Absent any legitimate ground upon which to reverse the
district court's ruling regarding the validity of the search, we
affirm.^

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
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Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Notwithstanding the State's briefing of whether Bartlett received
proper warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.
Ct. 1602 (1966), we decline to address the issue, which Bartlett
seems not to have raised on appeal.
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U T ST § 58-37a-5
U.C.A. 1953 §58-37a-5
C
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
CHAPTER 37a. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc./ a
member of the LexisNexis Group.
Current through 2003 First Special Session

58-37a-5

Unlawful acts.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate,
grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal,
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent
to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug
paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used to
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation
of this act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three years
or more younger than the person making the delivery is guilty of
a third degree felony.

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any
newspaper,
magazine,
handbill,
or
other
publication
any
advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to
promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates
this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 5

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

U T S T § 58-37-2
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-2
C
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
CHAPTER 37. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
58-37-2 Definitions.

(1) As used in this chapter:

(a) "Administer" means the direct application of a
controlled substance, whether by injection, inhalation,
ingestion, or any other means, to the body of a patient or
research subject by:

(i) a practitioner
authorized agent; or

or,

in

his

presence,

by

his

(ii) the patient or research subject at the direction
and in the presence of the practitioner.

(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf
of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or
practitioner but does not include a motor carrier, public
warehouseman, or employee of any of them.

(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual,
sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business
trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or groups of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit
entities created or maintained for the purpose of engaging
in conduct which constitutes the commission of episodes of
activity made unlawful by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b,
37c, or 37d, which episodes are not isolated, but have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing
characteristics.
Taken
together,
the

episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and
be related either to each other or to the enterprise.
(d) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the
placement of a drug, substance, or immediate precursor
under Section 58-37-3.
(e) (i) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance
included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section
58-37-4, and also includes a drug or substance included
in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal
Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, or any
controlled substance analog.
ii) "Controlled substance" does not include:
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as
those terms are defined or used in Title 32A,
regarding tobacco or food;
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease in man or other animals, which contains
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or
phenylpropanolamine
if
the
drug
is
lawfully
purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an
over-the- counter medication without prescription; or
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, 'minerals, herbs,
or other similar substances including concentrates or
extracts, which are not otherwise regulated by law,
which may contain naturally occurring amounts of
chemical or substances listed in this chapter, or in
rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 4 6a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.

(f) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means a substance
the chemical structure of which is substantially similar
to the chemical structure of a controlled substance

listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, or in
Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances
Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513:
(A)
which
has
a
stimulant,
depressant,
or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system
substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant,
or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system of controlled substances in the schedules set
forth in this subsection; or
(B) which, with respect to a particular individual,
is represented or intended to have a stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous
system
substantially
similar
to
the
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on
the central nervous system of controlled substances
in the schedules set forth in this subsection.
(ii) Controlled substance analog does not include:
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled
Schedules I through V of Section 58-37-4;

in

(B) a substance for which there is an approved new
drug application;
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is
in effect for investigational use by a particular
person under Section 505 of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 366, to the extent the
conduct with respect to the substance is permitted by
the exemption; or

(D) any substance to the extent not intended for
human consumption before an exemption takes effect
with respect to the substance.

(E) Any drug intended for lawful use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease in man or other animals, which contains
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or
phenylpropanolamine
if
the
drug
is
lawfully
purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an
over-the- counter medication without prescription.
(F) Dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs,
or other similar substances including concentrates or
extracts, which are not otherwise regulated by law,
which may contain naturally occurring amounts of
chemical or substances listed in this chapter, or in
rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(g) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by
verdict, whether jury or bench, or plea, whether guilty or
no contest, for any offense proscribed by Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or for any offense
under the laws of the United States and any other state
which, if committed in this state, would be an offense
under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d.
(h) "Counterfeit substance" means:
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any
substance
that
without
authorization
bears
the
trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark,
imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of a
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the
person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed,
or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be
a controlled substance distributed by, any other
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or
(ii) any substance that
controlled substance.
(i)

"Deliver"

or

is

"delivery"

represented

means

the

to

be

actual,

constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled
substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an agency
relationship exists.
(j) "Department" means the Department of Commerce.
(k) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means:
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric
acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid;
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of:
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers;
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical
isomer of amphetamine; or
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and
Human Services or the Attorney General of the United
States
after
investigation
has
found
and
by
regulation designated habit-forming because of its
stimulant effect on the central nervous system; or
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; or
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance
which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the
Attorney
General
of
the
United
States
after
investigation has found to have, and by regulation
designated as having, a potential for abuse because of
its depressant or stimulant effect on the central
nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect.

(1) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled
substance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to

the lawful order or prescription of a practitioner, and
includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging,
labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the
substance for delivery.
(m) "Dispenser" means
controlled substance.

a

pharmacist

who

dispenses

a

(n) "Distribute" means
to deliver
other
than by
administering or dispensing a controlled substance or a
listed chemical.
(o)
"Distributor" means
controlled substances.

a

person

who

distributes

(p) "Drug" means:
(i) articles recognized in the official United States
Pharmacopoeia, Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the
United States, or Official National Formulary, or any
supplement to any of them;
(ii) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man
or other animals;
(iii) articles, other than food, intended to affect the
structure or function of man or other animals; and
(iv) articles intended for use as a component of any
articles specified in Subsection (1) (p) (i) , (ii), or
(iii); but does not include devices or their components,
parts, or accessories.
(q) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who
unlawfully and habitually uses any controlled substance to

endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or
who is so dependent upon the use of controlled substances
as to have lost the power of self-control with reference
to his dependency.
(r) "Food" means:
(i) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or
animal origin other than a drug as specified in this
chapter, and normally ingested by human beings; and
(ii) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason
of a physical, physiological, pathological, or other
condition including but not limited to the conditions of
disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy,
hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight;
uses for supplying a particular dietary need which exist
by reason of age including but not limited to the ages
of
infancy
and
childbirth,
and
also
uses
for
supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual
diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary
property for use of a food. Any particular use of a food
is a special dietary use regardless of the nutritional
purposes.
(s) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the
Attorney General of the United States has found to be, and
by regulation designated as being, the principal compound
used or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of
a controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical
intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture
of a controlled substance, the control of which is
necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of
the controlled substance.

(t) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation,
propagation, compounding, or processing of a controlled
substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction
from substances of natural origin, or independently by
means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of
extraction and chemical synthesis.

(u) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages,
repackages, or labels any container of any controlled
substance, except pharmacists who dispense or compound
prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate consumer.
(v) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis
and all parts of the genus, whether growing or not; the
seeds of it; the resin extracted from any part of the
plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.
The term does not include the mature stalks of the plant,
fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the
seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks,
except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake,
or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of
germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the substances
contained in the plant cannabis sativa or any other
species of the genus cannabis which are chemically
indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also
included.
(w) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of
the United States or any foreign country.
(x) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether
produced directly or indirectly by extraction from
substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means
of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction
and chemical synthesis:
(i) opium, coca leaves, and opiates;
(ii) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
preparation of opium, coca leaves, or opiates;
(iii) opium poppy and poppy straw; or

or

(iv) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative, or preparation of the substance, which is
chemically identical with any of the substances referred
to in Subsection (l)(x)(i), (ii), or (iii), except
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves
or extracts of coca leaves which do not contain cocaine
or ecgonine.
(y) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an
unconditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are
legally transferable to another party by endorsement or
delivery.
(z) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an
addiction-forming
or
addiction-sustaining
liability
similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a
drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining
liability.

(aa) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species papaver
somniferum L., except the seeds of the plant.
(bb)
"Person" means
any
corporation,
association,
partnership, trust, other institution or entity or one or
more individuals.
(cc) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of
the opium poppy, after mowing.
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual
ownership,
control,
occupancy,
holding,
retaining,
belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation,
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished
from distribution, of controlled substances and includes
individual, joint, or group possession or use of
controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or
user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he
be shown to have individually possessed, used, or
controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is
shown that the person jointly participated with one or

more persons in the use, possession, or control of any
substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring,
or the controlled substance is found in a place or under
circumstances indicating that the person had the ability
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it.
(ee)
"Practitioner"
means
a
physician,
dentist,
veterinarian,
pharmacist,
scientific
investigator,
pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered,
or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct
research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching
or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course
of professional practice or research in this state.
(ff) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or
in writing.
(gg) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed
practitioner, in the course of that practitioner's
professional practice, for a controlled substance, other
drug, or device which it dispenses or administers for use
by a patient or an animal. The order may be issued by word
of
mouth,
written
document,
telephone,
facsimile
transmission, computer, or other electronic means of
communication as defined by rule.
(hh) "Production" means
cultivation, growing, or
substance.

the manufacture, planting,
harvesting of a controlled

(ii) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other
evidences of debt or of property.
(jj) "State" means the state of Utah.
(kk) "Ultimate user" means any' person who lawfully
possesses a controlled substance for his own use, for the
use of a member of his household, or for administration to
an animal owned by him or a member of his household.

(2) If a terra used in this chapter is not defined, the
definition and terms of Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, shall
apply.

History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 2; 1977, ch. 29, § 3; 1979, ch.
12, § 1; 1981, ch. 75, § 1; 1982, ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 190,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 50, § 1; 1989, ch. 186, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, §
60; 1991, ch. 198, § 1; 1992, ch. 121, § 1; 1994, ch. 132, §
2; 1996, ch. 170, § 53; 1996, ch. 294, § 1; 1997, ch. 64, § 2;
2003, ch. 131, § 40.
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Prohibited acts —Penalties.

(1) Prohibited acts A --Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled
or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with
intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or

more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or
37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person
occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other
position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
with respect to:

(1)(a)

(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree
felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of
Subsection
(1)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law,
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in
Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his
person or in his immediate possession during the commission
or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the
court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(1) (a) (iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B --Penalties:

(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess' or
use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance,/
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or'order/!
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control
of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or
other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or
distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess
an altered or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2) (a) (i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is
guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana^
if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100
pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a
third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an
extracted resin from any part of the plant, and the amount
is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of
confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree
greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession
of any controlled substance by a person, that person shall
be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided

in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with
respect to all other controlled substances not included in
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than
one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the
person is guilty of a third degree felony,
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2) (a) (ii) or (2) (a) (iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third
degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under
Subsection (4)(c) who, in an offense not amounting to a
violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and
intentionally having in his body any measurable amount of a
controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207
in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as
defined in Section 76- 1-601 or the death of another.
(3) Prohibited acts C --Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution
of a controlled substance a license number which is
fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person
or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist,
veterinarian, or other authorized person;

(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person
known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of,
or to procure the administration of any controlled substance
by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose
his receiving any controlled substance from another source,
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or
the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance, or to utter the same, or
to alter any prescription or written order issued or written
under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate,
stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or
reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying
mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any
of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so
as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a)
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D —Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act
declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58,
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58,
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications
under this Subsection (4) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or
on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those
schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or
other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the
act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a

school or institution under Subsections

(4)(a)(i) and (ii);

(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation
center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined
in Section 76- 10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena,
theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure
adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18
years of age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for
a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would
otherwise have been established but for this
subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been
established would have been less than a first degree felony
but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under
Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4) (a)
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was
as described in Subsection (4)(a).

(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is
specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section
is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or
administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
under federal law or the law of
another state for the
same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter,
evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the
character of the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good
faith and in the course of his professional practice only
and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or
administering controlled substances or from causing the
substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly
under his direction and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under
this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled
Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
legitimate scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application
of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held
invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, § 1; 1977, ch.

29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch.
196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch.
95, § 1; 1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch.
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 1990, ch.
161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch.
80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, § 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch.
284, § 1; 1996, ch. 1, § 8; 1997, ch. 64, § 6; 1998, ch.
139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, § 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1; 2003, ch.
10, § 1; 2003, ch. 33, § 6.
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NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. --The 1998 amendment, effective May 4,
1998, deleted former Subsection (6) which read: "Any person
who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree
less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense,"
redesignating the other subsections accordingly.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 12, effective May 3, 1999,
substituted "in the immediate presence of" for "with" in
Subsection (4)(a)(x) and made minor stylistic changes in
Subsections (2) and (4).
The 1999 amendment by ch. 303, effective May 3, 1999,
added Subsection
(l)(c), redesignating former Subsection
(1)(c) as (1)(d), substituted "chapter" for "subsection" in
Subsection (2)(a)(i), and made a minor stylistic change.
The 2003 amendment by ch. 10, effective May 5, 2003, added
Subsection (2)(g) and made a related change.
The 2003 amendment by ch. 33, effective May 5, 2003, added
"gamma hydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III" in
Subsection (1)(b)(i), making a related change; added
"controlled substances analog or a" in Subsection (2)(a)(i);
and substituted "or on the grounds of a house of worship as
defined in Section 76-10-501" for "a church or synagogue" in

Subsection (4)(a)(vi).
This section has been reconciled by the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Cross-References. --Cities and towns, prohibitions of
sales of narcotics to minors, § 10-8-47.
Abuse of psychotoxic chemical solvents, § 76-10-107.
Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204,
76-3-301.
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Expert testimony generally --Notice requirements.

(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any
expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing,
excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call
the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days
before the hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert,
the expert's curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare
to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively
consult with the opposing party on reasonable notice.
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(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible
for any fee charged by the expert for the consultation.
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in
whole or part on the results of any tests or other specialized
data, the party intending to call the witness shall provide to
the opposing party the information upon request.
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's
report or the information concerning the expert's proposed
testimony, the party receiving notice shall provide to the other
party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to
rebut the expert's testimony, including rhe information required
under Subsection (1)(b).
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to
substantially comply with the requirements of this section, the
opposing party shall, if necessary to prsvent substantial
prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this
section is the
result of bad faith on the part of any party
or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. The
remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if
the court finds that a party deliberately violated the
provisions of this section.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert
at a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert jj
the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's
proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to
by the expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the
preliminary hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy
of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to
trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an
expert witness.
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is
an employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long
as the opposing party is on reasonable rotice through genera^
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S Govt. Works

discovery that the expert may be calleShas a witness ""at* trial7
and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with
the opposing party upon reasonable notice*1

History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 139, § 3;
1999, ch. 43, § 1; 2003, ch. 290, § 2.
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NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. — T h e 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
inserted "held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure" in Subsection (1)(a); divided Subsections (1) to (4),
adding (a) and (b) designations; made two stylistic changes in
Subsection (3)(a); and added Subsection (5).
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, rewrote Subsections
(l)(b), (2), and (3); substituted "fails to substantially complj
with" for flfails to meet" and inserted "if necessary to prevent
substantial prejudice" in Subsection (4)(a); and added the
second sentence in Subsection (4)(b) and Subsection (6).
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